We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement problem under the total discussion rate constraint and characterized the secrecy capacity for the hypergraphical sources. Our result not only covers the existing characterization for pairwise independent network but also extends it to the case with helpers, where the existing tree-packing protocol is known to be suboptimal. We show that decremental secret key agreement is optimal instead, which resolves a previous conjecture in the affirmative. The converse is established by a single-letter upper bound on secrecy capacity for general sources that are not necessarily hypergraphical. The minimax optimization involved in the upper bound can be relaxed to give various existing bounds such as the lamination bounds for hypergraphical sources, helper-set bound for general sources, the bound at asymptotically zero discussion rate via multivariate Gác-Körner common information, and the lower bound on communication complexity via a multivariate extension of Wyner common information. Our result not only unifies existing bounding techniques but also reveals surprising connections between seemingly different information-theoretic notions. We point out further challenges by showing that the bound can be loose for a simple finite linear source.
Shannon's mutual of the user's private observations [1, 2] . If in addition that the number of rounds of interactive discussion is limited, the communication complexity that achieves the largest possible secrecy capacity was given by [6] . Subsequently, the secrecy capacity as a function of the individual discussion rates of the two users was derived in [7] . If the number of rounds is unlimited, however, these characterizations are not considered single-letter solutions as they involve optimizations over an unbounded number of auxiliary random variables, which are incomputable.
For the multiterminal case, the capacity was characterized in [8, 9] for the case with no discussion or at asymptotically 0 discussion rate. In the opposite extreme when the discussion is unlimited, the secrecy capacity was characterized in [5] when there is no wiretapper's side information. The capacity as a function of total discussion rate was characterized in [10] for the case without helpers and for a special source model called the pairwise independent network (PIN) model proposed in [11] . The capacity as a function of individual discussion rate is also characterized in [12] for the tree PIN model, and in [13, 14] for minimally connected hypergraphical sources. Other than the above special cases, there are various bounds on the secrecy capacity and communication complexity [12, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] for general and special source models, but exact characterizations remain unknown.
In particular, there is no immediate extension of existing solutions to cover the PIN model with helpers, and hypergraphical sources that are not necessarily minimally connected. This is because the achieving scheme for PIN model without helpers in [10, 12] used the tree-packing scheme of [11, 22] , which is not suboptimal in achieving even the secrecy capacity without discussion rate constraint. The solution for minimally connected hypergraphical sources in [13, 14] was derived using a bound in [12] that can be loose when the PIN model has cycles.
Our focus is primarily on the multerminal setting with an arbitrarily number of users and helpers. The goal is to unify different bounding techniques in existing works and improve them to give exact single-letter capacity characterizations for a larger class of source models beyond the PIN and minimally connected hypergraphical sources. In particular, for general hypergraphical sources, a plausible conjecture to resolve is the optimality of decremental secret key agreement for hypergraphical sources [12, 17] , and more generally, the optimality of compressed secret key agreement for finite linear sources [21] . If compressed secret key agreement could be shown to be optimal, some other related conjectures would also be resolved. For instance, the linear network coding scheme in [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] could be used for secret key agreement without loss of optimality, which implies that private randomization would not be needed by the linearity arguments in [20] .
In this work, we have unified and improved existing bounding techniques to show that decremental secret key agreement is optimal for hypergraphical source. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity can communication complexity for hypergraphical sources are characterized by linear programs that are polynomial-time computable. For finite linear sources, the conjecture remains unsolved but we give an example to illustrate the limitation of the converse result and the potential improvement. We remark that [28] also characterized the communication complexity for hypergraphical sources but under the assumption that the discussion is linear. Furthermore, [28] considered a one-shot model where the communication complexity was shown to be NP hard to compute. In contrast, we consider an asymptotic model without assuming the discussion is linear and obtained polynomial-time computable characterizations. We also remark that there is a duality between the secret key agreement problem and the problem of generating maximum common randomness (distributed simulation) [23, Theorem 2.3] . Hence, the results for secret key agreement can translate to the results for maximum common randomness and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate the secret key agreement problem for general sources and hypergraphic sources in Section II. Section II gives the main results, namely a improved converse for general sources and its reduction to the exact linear programming characterizations for hypergraphical sources. Section IV explains how the converse reduces to various existing bounds on secreccy capacity and communication complexity. Section V gives an example of finite linear source for which the converse is loose. The proofs are given in the appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement problem formulated in [5] for a multiterminal discrete memoryless source
distributed according to a given joint distribution P ZVZ over a possibly unbounded support set Z V ×Z. V is a finite set of users, Z i is the private sourcer of user i ∈ V , andZ is the wiretapper's side information.
For secret key agreement, every user i ∈ V observes an n i.i.d. sequence Z n i := (Z i1 , . . . , Z in ) and generates a private and possibly continuous random variable U i independent of the source, i.e.,
Then, the users engage in an interactive public discussion where some user i j ∈ V at round j ∈ {1, . . . , r} of the discussion reveals in public a finitely valued messagẽ
namely a deterministic function of the accumulated knowledge of user i j , which includes the private randomization U ij , source Z n ij , and all the previous discussionF j−1 . For notational simplicity, we define
namely the entire discussion by user i and by all users respectively.
After the public discussion, a subset A ⊆ V of the users, called the active users, wants to agree on a secret key K secured against a wiretapper observingZ n , the entire discussion F, and the source Z n D of a subset D ⊆ V \ A of users called the untrusted helpers. (V \ A is called the set of helpers, where V \ A \ D is the set of trusted helpers.) More precisely, a sequence in n of U V , F and K is a secret key agreement scheme if there exist decoding functions φ i for i ∈ A such that
where K denotes a finite set of possible secret key values. The prior condition (3) is called the recoverability constraint and the latter one (4) is called the secrecy (and uniformity) constraint.
A secret key rate r K ∈ R + is said to be achievable by the public discussion rates r V := (r i | i ∈ V ) ∈ R V + if and only if there exists a secret key agreement scheme (K, F) satisfying the above conditions (3) and (4), and the rate constraints
where F i denotes the set of possible messages by user i. Denotes the set of achievable rate tuple (r K , r V ) by
The secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable key rate denoted by
for
It is easy to see that the secrecy capacity is non-decreasing in the discussion rates. The communication complexity as a function of the key rate r K is defined as
which is simply the inverse of
In the rest of the paper, we will omit the dependency on V, A, D, Z V ,Z and write
for the case without untrusted helper (D = ∅) nor wiretapper's side information (Z = 0) unless otherwise specified. We will also write
respectively for the unconstrained secrecy capacity with unbounded discussion rate, and the communication complexity to attain the unconstrained the secrecy capacity. Consider a hypergraph (V, E, ξ) with vertex set V , edge set E and the edge function ξ : E → 2 V \{∅}, where ξ(e) denotes the set of vertices incident on an edge e ∈ E. A hypergraphical source is defined with respect to such a hypergraph as [23, 29] 
where X E := (X e | e ∈ E) is a given random vector and X e 's are independent random variables called the edge (random) variables with bounded supports. In other words, each user gets to observe a subset of the independent edge variables. This reduces to the pairwise independent network (PIN) model [11, 22] in the special case when each edge variable is observed by exactly two users, i.e., |ξ(e)| = 2, where the hypergraph reduces to a graph. One may also consider a hypergraphical source model with wiretapper's side information, wherẽ
for some given subsetẼ ⊆ E.
III. MAIN RESULTS
All the converse results in this paper are based on the following single-letter upper bound on the secrecy capacity. The bound applies to general sources and allows for trusted helpers, i.e., with D = ∅ but V \ A possibly non-empty.
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity (6) as a function of discussion rate r V ∈ R V is upper bounded as follows:
where • the maximization in the first expression (12a) is over the choices of an auxiliary random variable W (or its distribution P W|ZV more specifically) and a real vector
• the minimization in the second expression (12b) is over the choice of a set function λ :
λ is referred to as a fractional cover and we denote the set of all such fractional covers byΛ.
An important simplification is to consider the total discussion rate constraint instead of the individual rates. The above bound translates directly to the following bound on the secrecy capacity for a given total discussion rate.
Corollary 1
The secrecy capacity (7) for R ≥ 0 are upper bounded as follows:
where
and Λ denotes the set of fractional partitions λ : 
The corresponding lower bound on the communication complexity (8) ,
for any given secret key rate r K ≥ 0.
✷ PROOF See Appendix B.
Note that the above bounds involve an auxiliary random variable W, an optimal solution of which exists by standard support lemma [30] if the support of the random source is finite. It is also straight-forward to argue that the upper bounds on the secrecy capacity are non-decreasing, concave and continuous in the discussion rates. The two expressions ((12a) and (12b)) for the upper bound (12) are related by the linear programming duality [31] , where the minimization over λ is the dual of the maximization over r ′ V . λ(B) is the lagrangian multiplier for the constraints on r ′ V in (13) . It is instructive to compare r ′ V to the feasible rate of communication for omniscience [5] in
The above corresponds to the set of public discussion rate tuple such that each user can recover the entire source Z V after the discussion, i.e., attain omniscience. Suppose the source Z V has finite support. Then, the region must be non-empty.
The constraints in (13a) play a similar role as the Slepian-Wolf constraints in (21b) above. In particular, the two sets of constraints are the same if W = Z V and r ′ i = r i . This connection can be observed similarly in the bounds for total discussion rate instead of individual discussion rate. In particular, with W = Z V , ρ(W) defined in (17) becomes the smallest rate of communication for omniscience [5] 
where the last equality is again by the linear programming duality. With ρ(W) = R CO and assuming Z V has finite support, the bound (15b) on secrecy capacity becomes (16) , which is the unconstrained secrecy capacity characterized in [5] as
where I λ is the information measure defined in (18) . The last equality means that the bound (16) is tight when Z V has finite support. The expression is non-negative as expected because by the Shearer Lemma (see [32, Lemma D.1] or [23, 33] )
with equality if Z i 's are mutually independent. In the case without helpers, i.e., A = V , (23b) can be further simplified to the following multivariate mutual information as shown in [29, 34, 35] :
is the set of partitions of V into at least two non-empty disjoint sets. The first expression (25a) was given as an upper bound on C S in [5] . It can be obtained from (18) with
for any partition P of V . The constraint in the second expression (25b) is the constrained residual independence relation given in [35, 36] , which means that I(Z V ) is the smallest amount of shared information removal of which leads to independence. The bounds on the secrecy capacity and communication complexity can be shown to be tight for the hypergraphical sources as follows:
Theorem 2 For hypergraphical sources defined in (11a), the secrecy capacity (7) and communication complexity (8) are equal to the upper bound (15b) and lower bound (20) respectively, which can be simplified further by setting
and Q e 's are independent bits independent of the source with distribution
Corollary 2 For hypergraphical sources, R, r K ≥ 0,
where we define x(E ′ ) := e∈E ′ x e for E ′ ⊆ E as usual and
namely, the set of edges that are incident only on nodes within B. The linear programs above can be solved in polynomialtime.
The theorem is proved by showing that the bounds (15b) and (20) on the secrecy capacity can be achieved by the decremental secret key agreement scheme in [16, 37] . The linear programs in the corollary are obtained by evaluating the bounds (15b) and (20) explicitly with the optimal solution choice of the auxiliary random variable W in (27) .
The idea of decremental secret key agreement is to reduce the randomness of the source Z V by eliminating some randomness of each edge variable, leading to a reduced source Z ′ V , and then generate the secret key via omniscience of the reduced source, i.e., achieving the unconstrained secrecy capacity of Z ′ V . More formally, the reduced source is
where X ′ e and Q e are as defined in (27) for some vector
i by keeping only the first xe H(Xe) fraction of the n i.i.d. samples of X e for each edge e ∈ E with i ∈ ξ(e). An immediate generalization of decremental secret key agreement to general sources beyond hypergraphic sources is the compressed secret key agreement in [21] , where the reduced source Z ′ i can be chosen as arbitrary processing of Z i with a time sharing variable Q, i.e.,
The secret key rate
where, similar to the conditional entropy H(Z ′ V |Q), C S and R CO evaluated at Z ′ V |Q means conditioning on Q, i.e., with distribution P Z ′ V |Q (·|Q) as the source, and then take expectations with respect to Q.
The optimality of decremental secret key agreement resolved the conjecture in [17] that decremental secret key agreement is optimal and also the conjecture in [10] that linear network coding (discussion) is optimal. The idea of secret key agreement by linear network coding can be found in [24-27, 38, 39] . A straightforward extension of the results to the case with untrusted helpers and wiretapper's side information is as follows:
Proposition 1 In the case with untrusted helpers (D = ∅) and wiretapper's side information (11b), we have
which is obtained from Z i by removing the edge variables observed by the untrusted helpers and wiretappers.
✷ PROOF Note that ≥ for (34) holds because Z ′ i can be obtained from Z i for i ∈ V , and Z ′ V \D is independent of ()Z D ,Z). To explain the reverse inequality, note that the capacity does not decrease by turning the wiretapper into an untrusted helpers, i.e.,
with Z 0 =Z, assuming 0 ∈ V without loss of generality. The upper bound above can be further upper bounded by the R.H.S. of (34) as desired because P Y V \D = P ZV |ZD,Z by the independence of edge variables.
IV. REDUCTION TO VARIOUS CONVERSE RESULTS
In this section, we will show that the bounds in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 unify various exiting converse results. First of all, by the result of [5] that the upper bound (16) on C S can be achieved via communication for omniscience at the smallest rate, it is straightforward to show that, for any smallest omniscience rate tuple r V ∈ R CO : r(V ) = R CO and sum rate R ≥ R CO , the upper bounds (12), (15b), and (16) are tight, equal to the unconstrained secrecy capacity given by (23) . Furthermore, W = Z V is optimal to the maximizations in the upper bounds (12) and (15b). Indeed, if W = Z V is also optimal to the minimization in the lower bound (20) , the lower bound will also be tight:
Proposition 2 For Z V with finite support, R S = R CO , i.e., the communication for omniscience scheme in [5] for secret key agreement achieves R S , if W = Z V is an optimal solution to the minimization in the lower bound (20) on the communication complexity for some r K ∈ [0, C S ]. In particular, this holds if Z V has finite support and
where Λ * is the set of optimal solutions λ to (16) . (20) . Then, (20) becomes
Equality holds as desired since R S ≤ R CO by the omniscience scheme for secret key agreement in [5] .
Next, we show that (37) implies W = Z V is optimal to (20) with r K = C S as follows. By (20)
(a) is obtained by rewriting the constraint by (65) and C S (R) = min λ∈Λ I λ (Z V ) by (23) , which in turn holds as R CO < ∞ for Z V with finite support. (b) is because, for any λ ∈ Λ * , the constraint implies that
Finally, if (37) holds, we have
as desired by (23).
The above result covers the sufficient condition in [19, 32] . More precisely, the sufficient condition in [32] is in terms of the multivariate Wyner common information defined below with respect to a fractional partition λ as
(37) can be rewritten as
, which is the sufficient condition in [32] with helpers.
In the other extreme where the discussion rate has to be 0, the upper bounds on the secrecy capacity are also tight, which cover the result in [9] with helpers.
Proposition 3 With r ′ V = 0 and R = 0, the secrecy capacity upper bounds (12) and (15b) are tight and simplifies to the Gács-Körner common information
Furthermore, the optimal solution G, called the maximal common function of Z i for i ∈ A, is an optimal solution for W in (12) and (15b). ✷ PROOF With r V = 0, (13a) and (13b) implies that a feasible W must satisfy
where the last equality is obtained by setting B = V \ {i}. By the double Markov inequality [40, Problem 16.25] ,
for the optimal solution G to (40) . It follows that
which implies by (12a) that
Equality holds as desired as we can use the entire randomness of G for the secret key without any discussion. More precisely, by [ 
The constraint (40a) requires G to have finite support. If we set W = G, then ρ(W) = 0 in (17) by the constraint (40b) that G is a function of Z i for any i ∈ A, and hence the name common function. The secrecy capacity upper bound (15b) then becomes H(G) = J GK (Z A ). The bound is achievable intuitively because G is a common function of the active users and so, even with no discussion, a common secret key can be extracted from G at rate H(G).
Other than the two extreme cases with unlimited or 0 discussion rate, the secrecy capacity upper bound (12) strictly improves the existing bounds for multiterminal secret key agreement. In particular, it implies the following result that not only cover the bound in [12, Theorem 4.1] for general sources but also extends it to the case with helpers.
For all S ⊆ V : |A \ S| ≥ 2 and λ ′ :
i.e., λ ′ is a fractional partition of V \ S.
✷

PROOF See Appendix E
It is instructive to consider the condition on r K where the bound becomes trivial for a given choice of S, i.e., r(S) ≥ 0. Since the factor 1 B∈H λ ′ (B)−1 is strictly positive, the bound is trivial only if
This is intuitive because, by (23b), the expression on the right is the unconstrained secrecy capacity when S is removed or not allowed to discuss. (41) is called the helper-set bound because it gives how much discussion (help) users in S need so that users in V \ S can share a key at rate beyond their capacity.
Although the bound (41) looks quite different from the original bound (12b), it can be derived easily from the original bound by exchanging the maximization and minimization, and then restricting the set of possible λ appropriately. The bound in [12, Theorem 4.1] for the case without helpers, i.e., A = V , can be obtained from (41) with
for any partition P of V \ S. For hypergraphical sources, since the characterizations of the secrecy capacity in (11) is tight, it covers the lamination bounds in [10] . The following result unifies the lamination bounds:
Proposition 5 For hypergraphical sources and R ≥ 0, Note that the upper bound is linear in R and the slope can be bounded as follows.
Proposition 6 For hypergraphical sources, the slope of R in the upper bound (44) can be bounded as follows:
denotes the maximum degree of the edges in E ′ . Furthermore, the bounds in (47) can be achieved with equality for some hypergraphs.
✷ PROOF See Appendix G.
To reduce the upper in (44) to the EP bound in [10] , consider as in [10] the case A = V , H(X E ′ ) = 0 and H(X E\E ′ ) = 0. Let
for any partition P of V with |P| > 1. Then,
Substituting the above into (44) gives the EP bound [10, Theorem 4.1]. Next, to reduce to the VP bound in [10] , define for
Applying the above to (44) In particular, with u V chosen to be the solution to τ = max
Applying the above into (44) gives the VP bound [10, Theorem 4.3].
V. CHALLENGES For hypergraphical sources, it is plausible that the upper bound (12) of C S (r V ) in Theorem 1 may also tight. In this work, we have only shown that the corresponding upper bound (15b) of C S (R) in Corollary 2 under total discussion rate constraint instead of individual rate constraints is tight.
If we consider more general sources, however, the bound (15b) on C S (R) may be loose. In this section, we will give an example of finite linear source where the bound (20) on R S is loose, and so is (15b). Nevertheless, it remains plausible that compressed secret key agreement and linear network coding is optimal for general finite linear sources.
Consider A = V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
where X a , X b , X c , X d are uniformly random and independent bits, and ⊕ denotes the XOR or binary addition operation. 
To do so, it suffices to show that a feasible solution W to the
because then the bound is at most
as desired. It remains to show the feasibility, i.e., the following constraint holds,
In particular, we will argue that a feasible solution with r ′ (V ) ≤ 2 is
More precisely, we will argue that the constraint (13a) that
We can divide all the cases of B as follows:
• 4 ∈ B and 5 ∈ B. Then,
and so the constraint holds trivially as r ′ i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first derive (12b) from (12a). By the linear programming duality, we can rewrite (12a) as
The above constraint holds if and only if λ ∈Λ
Substituting (54) into (51) gives (12b), and we need only impose (52) but not (53) as (12b) does not depend on µ V . To prove (12a), we first consider the case without randomization. More precisely, let C NR S (r V ) be the secrecy capacity (6) but with no randomiziation, i.e., with (1) replaced by U V = 0. We want to the that C NR S (r V ) is bounded by (12a). For i ∈ V , let r ′ i := 1 n 1≤j≤r:ij =i H(F j |F j−1 ).
It follows that
where the first inequality is because conditioning reduces entropy; the last two steps are by (2b) and respectively (5b) for some δ n → 0 as n → 0. Furthermore, for B ⊆ V ,
where the first inequality is again because conditioning reduces entropy; the second equality is because the terms in the summation is 0 for i ∈ V \ B by the definition (2a) ofF j . For B = V , the first inequality holds with equality and so
Next, we single-letterize the key rate and discussion rate as follows. Let
and J be a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n} and independent of all other random variables. By the secrecy constraint (4), Similarly, by (3) and Fano's inequality,
for some δ n → 0 as n → 0. (f) is by (56). (g) follows from (e) while (h) follows from the same argument for (e). (60) follows from (56). Since (55), (59), and (60) holds for any secret agreement scheme (K, F), we have the desired bound (12a) on C NR S (r V ) by setting n → ∞ and noting that P Z V J = P ZV .
It remains to extend the bound (12a) to the general case with randomization (1) where U V not necessarily deterministic. Let
We have
because a secret key agreement scheme with randomization for Z V is also a secret key agreement scheme with no randomization but for Z ′ V . It suffices to show that the R.H.S. is upper bounded by (12) .
Applying the bound (12b) with the source Z ′ V instead of Z V for the secrecy capacity with no randomization, we have
It suffices to show that the above bound is upper bounded by (12b), i.e., the bound above remains valid after replacing Z ′ V by Z V . In particular, we will show that
Consider V = {1, . . . , m} without loss of generality and definer
It follows that
where the inequality holds with equality if B = V . This is because which implies (62) as desired and therefore completes the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
We first derive the bound (16) on the unconstrained capacity by (15b). By the definition 18 of I λ ,
Hence, by (15b), for R ≥ 0,
which gives (16) as desired since the bound does not depend on R.
Next, we derive the upper bounds (15a) and (15b) on C S (R) from the upper bound (12) on C S (r V ) as follows: For R ≥ 0. By (7),
which gives (15b) as desired. (b) also gives (15a). (a) is by (12) . (b) is because (13b) and r(V ) ≤ R imply r ′ (V ) ≤ R. (c) is because it is optimal to choose r ′ V to minimize r ′ (V ). Finally, we can derive the lower bound (20) on R S (r K ) from (15b) as follows: By (8),
which implies (20) as desired. (e) is by (15b). (f) is obtained by setting R = ρ(W) without loss of optimality. (g) is because, for any feasible W to (f), we also have a feasible W ′ to (g) and vice versa. E.g., given W, one can choose
and so the condition in (g) can be satisfied with some ǫ ∈ [0, 1] as desired. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we show that the upper bound (15b) on the secrecy capacity is tight for hypergraphical sources. Indeed, we will show that the lower bound (20) on communication complexity is tight showing that the following sufficient condition for tightness holds for hypergraphical sources. 
Furthermore, compressed secret key agreement [21] is optimal in achieving R S (r K ) and therefore C S (R) (15b) for R ≥ 0. ✷ PROOF Consider any optimal solution W to (20) satisfying the condition (66). We will show that
Then, the lower bound (20) can be written as
which is the desired reverse inequality of the bound (20) . (a) follows from the constraint on W in (20) . (b) is by the definition (17) of ρ(W). (c) is obtained by rewriting
where the second equality is by (67) and the last equality is by the definition (18) 
where the first inequality is by (c) and the second equality is by (67). It remains to show (67) as follows. For B ⊆ V ,
as desired where the last equality is because
This completes the proof.
Note that W defined in (27) satisfies (66) with Z ′ i defined as in (31) . In particular,
where E(B) is defined in (30) as the set of edges that are incident only on nodes within B. By the above lemma, it suffices to show that W defined in (27) is an optimal solution to the lower bound (20) . For simplicity, we rewrite the lower bound (20) as
Since the above maximization share the same set of solutions W as that of the lower bound (20) , it suffices to show that W defined in (27) is optimal to the above maximization.
We further rewrite T without changing the set of optimal W below:
where E(·) is defined in (30) , and
• (a) is obtained by rewriting the constraint in (69) as
.
• (b) is obtained by expanding I λ (Z V |W) by its definition (18) . • ≤ for (c) is because any optimal solution W to (b) is feasible to (c). To explain ≥ for (c), suppose to the contrary that there exists a solution W to (c) with H(Z V |W) > T . Then, that solution is also feasible to (b) because the constraint of (c) with T < H(Z V |W) implies the constraint in (b), which is the desired contradiction since the maximum in (b) equals T .
. Note that the additional constraints in (d) but not (c) hold trivially as the edge variables have bounded supports. It remains to argue that W defined in (27) is an optimal solution to (d). More precisely, we will show that this choice of W achieves the maximum given by the linear program
where y(E ′ ) := e∈E ′ y e for E ′ ⊆ E as usual. For any optimal solution µ, since H(X E ′ |W) is submodular in E ′ ⊆ E, i.e.,
we have by Edmonds' greedy algorithm (see [10, Lemma A.1] ) that, for any solution W to (d),
≤ T ′ as desired by (71b).
• To show T ≥ T ′ , consider any optimal solution y E to (71) and define W by (27) with
The above definition of W is valid because (71a) implies
The first equality is by (27a) that W = (Q E , X ′ E ). The second equality is by the independence of (Q e , X ′ e , X e ) for e ∈ E, which follows from (27b) and (27c). The third equality is by the fact that H(X ′ e |X e , Q e ) = 0 by (27b). The last equality is by the definition (73) of y e . It follows that the constraint in (d) holds, i.e., for all λ ∈ Λ,
by (71b). By the feasibility of W to (d),
T ≥ H(X E |W) = y(E) = T ′ as desired. The first equality is by (74) and the last is by the optimality of y E to (71).
D. Proof of Corollary 2
With the definition (11) of W and the definition (31) 
where (a) is by (67), (b) is by (68), (c) is by (27b), and (d) is by (27c).
Applying the above equality to the capacity upper bound (15a) and (15b) gives (28a) and (28b) respectively. Similarly, (29) follows from (20) .
By the ellipsoid method [31] , to show that the linear programs are polynomial-time solvable, it suffices to show that the following separation oracle for (28a) is.
In particular, in the last expression, min i∈A min B⊆V \{i} is equivalent to min B⊆V :B ⊇A . It is straightforward to verify that the above inequality holds if and only if (r V , x E ) is a feasible solution to (28) . It suffices to show that the last minimization
is polynomial-time solvable despite having exponentially many constraints. To argue this, note that by (75)
which is submodular in B by the submodularity of entropy [41] . Hence, (76) is a submodular function minimization over a lattice family, namely the boolean lattice, whichis known to be strongly polynomial-time solvable [42] . This completes the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider S ⊆ V : |A \ S| ≥ 2 and fractional partition λ ′ : {B ⊆ V \ S : B ⊇ A \ S} → R + of V \ S as stated in the proposition. To prove the necessary condition (41) for C S (r V ) ≥ r K and r V ∈ R V + , it suffices to show the following upper bound
In particular, we will show that the above bound is given by the upper bound (12b) with λ ∈Λ defined in terms of λ ′ as follows:
λ ∈ barΛ, i.e., (14) holds, because
The last inequality is because, for any i ∈ V \ S, we have ∆ ≥ B ⊇A\S:i∈B λ(B) = 1.
Note that the upper bound (12b) remains a valid upper bound for any given choice of λ, i.e.,
With the choice of λ given by (79), where the last equality is by (80).
where the last equality is again by (80).
≥0 by Shearer Lemma (see (24)).
Hence, 1 − 2 + 3 can be upper bounded by (78), which completes the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the characterization (28b) of C S (R). It is optimal to set x e = H(X e ) ∀e ∈ E \ E ′ because ρ does not depend on the above x e 's as ξ(e) ⊇ A for e ∈ E \ E ′ . (28b) can be rewritten as
The above maximization is at least 0, for instance, by choosing x e = 0 for all e ∈ E ′ . This implies the first inequality in (44) as desired. It remains to show the second inequality.
Consider the case H(X E ′ ) = 0 and so α = 1 by definition (70). Then, in (28b), we must have
Hence, the maximum in (81) is 0, which implies (44) as desired since α = 1 by the definition (70).
Consider the remaining case H(X E ′ ) = 0 and any optimal solution x E ′ and ρ to (81) such that ρ > 0. To show that the choice of optimal solution is possible, note that any feasible solution satisfies
by the Shearer Lemma. (See (24) and (77).) Suppose to the contrary that any optimal solution must have ρ = 0. By (81b), we must have x e = 0 for all e ∈ E ′ which implies x(E ′ ) − ρ = 0. This is a contradiction because it is possible to choose x e > 0 for some e ∈ E ′ as H(X E ′ ) = 0, and such choice is also optimal as x(E ′ ) − ρ ≥ 0 by (82). Next, with the optimal solution x E ′ and ρ > 0, (81) becomes
, which gives the second inequality in (81). By (81b),
where the last equality is obtained by setting
Note that p is a probability distribution over E ′ since p(E ′ ) = 1 and p(e) ∈ [0, 1] for e ∈ E ′ by (81c). Let P(E ′ ) be the set of all possible distributions over E ′ . Then, 
We first argue that the constraint x e ≤ H(X e ) in (81b) can be removed without changing the maximization in (81), i.e., Next, we argue that the constraint ρ ≤ R in (86) must be tight for the optimal solution. Suppose to the contrary that the constraint is slack. Then, (86) simplifies to
where the last inequality is because = min
where the first is by (eq:LB:eq1), the second equality is by (c) and (d), and the last equality is by rewriting P e = p defined in (83). Now, given any feasible solution x E ′ to (87), 2x E ′ is a strictly better solution, and so the maximum in (87) must be unbounded, contradicting the fact that (81) is bounded by H(X E ′ ).
Altogether, for any optimal solution x E ′ and ρ = R > 0, i.e., (b) also holds with equality. This completes the proof.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
The first inequality in (47) follows immediately from (44) with any R > 0. Equality holds trivially if E ′ ∈ E(C 1 ) ∪ E(C 2 ) for some bipartition {C 1 , C 2 } such that C i ∩ A = ∅ for all i ∈ {1, 2}. This is because one can show that max λ∈Λ α(λ) = 1 with λ(B) = 1 for B = V \ C i , i ∈ {1, 2}, and λ(B) = 0 otherwise.
To show the second inequality, let Combining the two cases above, we have
which can be shown to simplify to the second inequality in (47) as desired. If the hypergraph is a complete d-uniform hypergraph, then all the above inequality can be satisfied with equality with some edge, and so equality can be achieved for the second inequality in (47).
